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Recent years, more and more scholars begin to study relations between 
government and frims.The government provide trade environment while enterprise 
provide goods. There are many problems when market is adjusting the economic 
operation. Enterprise has to handle the failure of system. The legal system and 
constraint mechanism is not perfected in many regions and countries, Private property 
rights cannot be well protected in places there. Many companies turn to build 
"relationship" between the government and, as also, it is an effective alternative to 
overcome the defects in the transformation of the economic mechanism. Of course, 
there are some scholars pointed out that enterprise to establish a link between political 
was actually out of "rent-seeking”, On the other hand, the Chinese government 
allocated a lot of subsidies for listed companies, the amount of subsidy increases 
every year, subsidies is becoming more diverse, Many scholars point out that China's 
private enterprises executives to actively build relationships with government is to get 
more subsidies. 
 This paper mainly research on companies listed on GEM. Based on random 
effect and two-step GMM,It mainly answers the following questions:①Does political 
relation bring more government subsidies? Is there any difference between companies 
of different level of local government finance? Is there any difference between 
State-owned enterprises and private enterprises of political association to obtain 
government subsidies?②How is the actual results of government subsidies? Is it 
significantly enhance the promotion of economic performance? After considering the 
degree of political relevance, does the effect of the subsidy change? After empirical 
test of GEM listed companies, It turns out that: Firstly, On the whole, politically 
connected business executives did not significantly affect government subsidies, even 
after taking into account local fiscal surplus situation, still there is no significant 
impact; But in considering the premise of local financial level, further distinguishing 
between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, we found that in state-owned 













 political association to obtain government subsidies, but this phenomenon does not 
existin private enterprises. Secondly, Government subsidies can significantly promote 
the enterprise's economic performance, but after taking into account the political 
relevance, this promotion would be significantly be weaken .To some extent, it proves 
that political association led to the inefficient social resources operations. 
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